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INTRODUCTION

This article is written, first, as a result of our interest in the
resolution of criminal cases fairly, including short of trial, and the proper
role of judges in that process. Rather than assume a "neutral" posture, we
readily admit our bias that there is a useful and just place for judges in the
plea bargaining process. Second, it is our hope to begin a more open and

Judge Borenstein (ret.) has been a partner at Rudolph Friedmann, LLP, Boston,
MA since
September 2008, specializing in civil litigation and criminal defense. He served on the
Massachusetts Superior Court for almost sixteen years, and served six years on the Lawrence
District Court. He has served as Lecturer in Law at Northeastern University School of Law and
as an Adjunct Professor at Suffolk Law School for many years, and has been a full time law
professor. He expresses his deep gratitude to and respect for Erin Anderson, whose wisdom and
endless hours of work on this article made it possible.
. B.A., with honors, Trinity College, 2004; J.D. candidate, Suffolk University Law School,
2009.

2

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIV

ongoing discussion between judges, attorneys, journalists, victims' rights
organizations, and others affiliated with or interested in the justice system
regarding judicial participation in plea negotiations. It is our strong belief
that such dialogue will lead to a more predictable and consistent process in
Massachusetts.
It is our view that judicial participation in plea negotiations can
benefit everyone, particularly if handled properly. Discussion of these
issues has often been relegated to dicta, judicial conferences, off-the-record
conversations, infrequent continuing legal education seminars, and an
occasional mention in the media. Perhaps there is no more powerful
showing of the need to openly acknowledge this than the recent and highlypublicized case of Murphy v. Boston Herald Inc.,' where the Supreme
Judicial Court forcefully made clear that,
If there ever was a case that demonstrates the need for
lobby conferences, where cases or other court matters are
discussed, to be recorded, this is the case. This litigation,
with all its unfortunate consequences for those involved,
might not have occurred if the critical lobby conference.
.had been transcribed. We trust that the lesson learned here
will be applied by trial judges to prevent unnecessary
problems that often arise from unrecorded lobby
conferences.
This article is structured as follows. First, we explain the state of
the law regarding judicial participation in plea negotiations as it exists
nationally. Next follows a discussion on the benefits and dangers of the
practice. Third, suggestions are presented for how best to allow judges to
assume a role in the attainment of either a plea agreement or a defendant's
decision to plead guilty, even absent an agreement with the government (a
so-called guilty plea with an un-agreed recommendation). Finally, we
discuss what a proposed rule would include, as the means for resolving
cases with a judge's participation, but in ways that are transparent and fair
to all involved.
An overwhelming percentage of criminal cases are resolved with
the defendant pleading guilty. 3 There is minimal information available

1 865 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 2007).
2 Id. at 758 n.15.
3 See U.S. Department of Justice, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2004 Statistical Tables, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scsO4401
tab.htm. In 2004, of the felony convictions in a nationally representative sample of state courts in
three-hundred counties, just five percent of defendants exercised their right to either a jury or
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telling us what role a judge has played, if any, in a defendant's decision to
plead guilty, and specifically whether the judge participated at all in any
negotiations; in how many cases a judge participated; and, in those cases
where the judge did participate, whether the case ended in a guilty plea or a
trial. A number of reasons may motivate a defendant to plead guilty. It is
not the aim of this article to explore all of these, but rather to focus on the
role that a judge may play in that decision.
The apparent reluctance in Massachusetts to discuss openly and
develop clear rules about judges participating in plea bargaining, along
with what changes need to be made and guidelines enacted, may well be
the understandable tension created between serious concerns raised by
judges engaging in such activities and the administrative necessity to not
have every defendant go to trial. It has often been said that without guilty
pleas the criminal justice system would collapse.4
Judicial participation in plea negotiations is by no means a
revolutionary idea or practice.5
Judges are participating in plea
negotiations across the country and using various methods to do so.6 The
scope of the issue is illustrated by the number of states that directly and
specifically address it through a rule or case law.7 Our goal here is, in part,
to openly recognize that judges are participating, show how widely the
practice has been addressed, and make recommendations about how judges
can fairly, beneficially, and effectively exercise a role in the process. By
involving themselves in plea negotiations, judges have the unique
opportunity to even the playing field between the parties during discussions
and serve as a neutral arbiter, listening to the parties' respective arguments
for their proposed sentences, reacting to these requests, giving the parties

bench trial and ninety-five percent pleaded guilty. Id.
4 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (describing plea bargaining as
"essential component of the administration of justice"). The Court went on to state, "If every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities." Id. But see Scott v.
United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating this argument relies on assumption and
not actual evidence). See also Commonwealth v. Lebon, 643 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (expressing understanding that by participating in plea negotiations, trial judge was
motivated to move trial list along).
5 See in/ra notes 25-49 and accompanying text.
6 See Murphy, 865 N.E.2d at 758 (warning against judge's participation in unrecorded plea
discussions in chambers); Commonwealth v. Carter, 733 N.E.2d 582, 583 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)
(describing judge's side bar discussion with attorneys regarding plea negotiations);
Commonwealth v. Ford, 626 N.E.2d I, 4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (discussing judge's alleged
vindictiveness during sidebar conversation with counsel about plea); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
543 N.E.2d 22, 24 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (explaining judge's conference with counsel after close
of evidence and final arguments).
7 See iqn/ra notes 12-49 and accompanying text.
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insight into the ultimate decision-maker's opinion, and often increasing the
likelihood that they will come to an agreement.8 In some cases, this will

avoid a victim or victim's family having to go through a trial, or a
defendant not being able to accept responsibility for his crime over a minor
misunderstanding between the parties regarding guilty pleas, a lack of

knowledge about the criminal justice system, the inability of the attorneys
to communicate, or the unreasonableness of one of the parties. 9 This article
advocates for judges' reactive, not active, participation; meaning, judges
should not assume a dominant or directive role in discussions between
counsel, but should use their involvement to absorb information, listen to

arguments by counsel, comment on their sentencing requests, and, where
appropriate, request more information, take time to deliberate on, and

perhaps indicate a possible sentence. 10
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW ON JUDICIAL INVOLEMENT IN PLEA
NEGOTIATIONS: OUTSIDE MASSACHUSETTS
Notwithstanding a perceived unwillingness to openly discuss this
issue, and with no specific, detailed rules and guidelines about its practice
in Massachusetts, many jurisdictions have attempted to grapple more
clearly and definitively with whether to allow judicial participation in plea
negotiations, and if permitted, how judges can do so appropriately. In this
section, we provide examples of jurisdictions that expressly prohibit
judicial participation in plea negotiations and those that allow it, but with

8 See JAY FOLBERG, DWIGHT GOLANN, LISA KLOPPENBERG & THOMAS STIPANOWICH,

RESOLVING DISPUTES 372 (Aspen Publishers 2005) (discussing use of mediation in criminal
cases). "One of the most controversial uses of mediation is in criminal cases. The vast majority
of criminal charges, ranging from small misdemeanors to capital cases, are plea bargained-that is,
negotiated by prosecutors and defense counsel-rather than tried. Mediation has not, however,
been used with any frequency to assist the process of plea bargaining." Id.
9 See Cripps v. State, 137 P.3d 1187, 1190-91 (Nev. 2006) (reiterating state's argument in
favor of court creating guidelines for the practice). The state not only asked that the court create a
set of guidelines governing judicial participation in plea negotiations and allow the judge to tell
the defendant whether the parties' sentencing recommendations would be followed, but also
suggested that if the judge informed the defendant of a potential sentence, a reluctant defendant
would have more information available to aid him in the decision of whether to plead guilty. Id.
10 See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 574 N.E.2d 974, 976 n.3 (Mass. 1991) (prohibiting judges'
active participation in plea negotiations).
In a footnote, the court stated, "We take this
opportunity to remind judges that they are not to participate as active negotiators in plea
bargaining discussions." Id. at 976 n.3. See also Commmonwealth v. Bowen, 827 N.E.2d 751,
753 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (reiterating principles in Gordon). The Bowen court stated, "The
text of rule 12 does not include an express prohibition against judicial involvement in plea
bargaining, but 'judges . . . are not to participate as active negotiators in plea bargaining
discussions."' Id.
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limitations or conditions attached. In the subsequent section, we describe
the state of the law in Massachusetts. The fact that the majority of

jurisdictions take no clear position may reflect the ambivalence about the
importance of judicial participation in plea negotiations and the concerns
they raise.
In the federal courts, judicial involvement in plea negotiations is
expressly prohibited."' Several states follow the Federal Rules and exclude
judges from being involved in plea negotiations, mostly by prohibiting it in
their court rules, but also in court decisions.1 2 Colorado exemplifies the
view that it is inappropriate for judges to engage with counsel and/or the
parties in these discussions. The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
'3
explicitly state, "The trial judge shall not participate in plea discussions."'

Colorado case
participation:

law outlines the reasoning for not allowing such

[A trial judge's] participation in plea bargaining is
fundamentally unfair and brings to bear the full force and
majesty of the court on a defendant. Moreover, when the
trial judge couples his intervention with threats of a longer
sentence if the defendant goes to trial and is found guilty,

he has attempted to use his office to force the defendant to

FED. R. CRIM. P.11(c)(1).
12 See N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-304(A)(1) (2008) (attorneys can discuss guilty pleas but
court shall not participate in discussions.) Additional commentary for this New Mexico rule
indicates that before the adoption of paragraph (A), a judge's involvement in plea negotiations
"varied with the interest of the individual district court judges." Id. at cmt. More than forty years
ago, the New Mexico Supreme Court, however, questioned the propriety of such involvement.
See State v. Scarborough, 410 P.2d 732, 736 (N.M. 1966). As a result, the rule completely
eliminated judicial involvement and allowed judges only to accept or reject the plea agreement.
N.M. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 5-304(A)(1) (2008) cmt. Several other states take a similar
approach. W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (bright line rule that judges cannot participate in the plea
bargaining process); State v. Sugg, 456 S.E.2d 469, 487 (W. Va. 1995) ("absolute bar" on trial
judge's participation in plea bargaining); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c)(1) (2008) (North Dakota rule
prohibiting court's participation in plea negotiations); State v. Wolfe, 175 N.W.2d 216, 221(Wis.
1970) (strongly recommending that trial judge not participate in plea negotiations); TENN. R.
CRIM. P. I l(c)(1) (2008) (court shall not participate in plea discussions in Tennessee); State v.
McDonald, 662 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (following ABA standards and prohibiting
judicial involvement in plea negotiations). The Texas court gave four reasons for not allowing
judicial participation in plea negotiations: (1)the trial court's role as a neutral arbiter is
compromised when the court attempts to persuade the defendant to accept a plea; (2) if the
defendant rejects the plea offer there is a possibility of prejudice on the part of the court; (3) the
court has power over the defendant, giving it an advantage in negotiations and causing the
defendant to consider unhappy consequences if he rejects the court's offer; and (4) during such
negotiations, the defendant may make admissions or confessions that would otherwise not be
admissible before the court. Id.
13 COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(0(4) (2008).
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waive his right to a jury trial or be penalized for exercising
a constitutionally guaranteed right. In our view,
participation by the trial judge
in the plea bargaining
4
process must be condemned.'
In some jurisdictions that bar the practice, courts have gone out of
their way to clearly separate a judge's participation in negotiations from the
parties presenting a tentatively reached plea agreement and then allowing
the judge to react to that. 15 For instance, in Georgia, the Superior Court
Rules indicate, "The trial judge should not participate in plea
discussions."' 16 The case law, however, allows the parties to present a
judge with a provisional plea agreement: "If the parties negotiate a tentative
plea agreement, the trial court may indicate whether it will concur with the
agreement, but that review is separate from the plea negotiation process
itself., 1 7 Later Georgia cases further outline the limits of the rule,

14 People v. Clark, 515 P.2d 1242, 1243 (Colo. 1973) (emphasis added).
15 See OR. REV. STAT. § 135.432(l)(a) (2008) (prohibiting judicial participation). The
Oregon statute goes on to provide exceptions to barring judicial involvement, one of which is
participating in tentative plea agreements. Id. The manner in which the judge is permitted to
participate once a tentative plea agreement has been reached is specifically outlined in sections
(2)-(4) of the statute. Id Missouri has a similar rule. Mo. SuP. CT. R.24.02(d) (court shall not
participate in plea agreement procedure). The rule in Missouri goes on to state that "after a plea
agreement has been reached, the court may discuss the agreement with the attorneys including
any alternatives that would be acceptable." ld; see also Mo. SUP. CT. R.37.58 (2008) (stating
similar rule as 24.02 regarding pleas generally). The rule in Arkansas is comparable. ARK. R.
CRIM. P. 25.3(a) (2008) (prohibiting judicial participation in plea negotiations). Similar to the
rules previously cited, the Arkansas rule allows the trial judge to participate once a tentative plea
agreement has been reached and to concur with the agreement if he so chooses. ARK. R. CRIM.
P.25.3(b) (2008). The same holds true in Minnesota courts. 49 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04(1)
(2008) (stating prosecution can only discuss pleas and reach agreement with defendant through
defense counsel). The Minnesota rule then outlines the role of the trial judge, which begins once
a plea agreement has been reached between the parties. 49 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04(3) (2008):
see also Miles v. State, 512 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn. 1994) (Foley, J., concurring) (reiterating
principle that trial judges are not permitted to participate in plea negotiations). Justice Foley went
out of his way to write separately and remind trial judges of this principle. Id. Utah courts
support the same view. UT. R. CRIM. P. II (i)(1) (2008) (prohibiting judge from participating in
plea discussions before plea agreement made by prosecution). New Jersey employs a comparable
rule. IA N.J. CT. R. 3:9-3 (2008) (prohibiting judge's participation except (emphasis added) after
tentative plea agreement reached and at request of both parties). Nevada courts also limit judicial
participation until after the parties themselves come to a conclusion. See Cripps v. State, 137
P.3d 1187, 1190 (Nev. 2006) (allowing judge to indicate sentence preference after (emphasis
added) parties present recommendation).
16 GA. SUPER. CT. R. 33.5(A) (2008) (prohibiting trial judge from initiating plea
discussions).
17 McDaniel v. State, 522 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Ga. 1999). In McDaniel, after the preliminary
voir dire of the jurors during the trial, the judge called for a conference to discuss the possibility
of the defendant pleading guilty. Id. at 649. The trial judge summarized its discussion with
counsel in chambers on the record. Id. In the summary, the judge indicated his reluctance to
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indicating that judicial participation is prohibited "when it becomes so
great as to render the plea involuntary," including when a trial judge makes
comments to the defendant indicating that if he rejects a plea offer and goes
to trial, he will face a greater sentence. 18
Illinois offers another example of this distinction. The Illinois
Supreme Court Rules make clear that, "The trial judge shall not initiate
plea discussions.',' 9 This rule also outlines how the judge shall permissibly
participate once a tentative plea agreement has been reached.20 The rule
allows the trial judge to not only hear the tentative plea agreement with the
permission of both parties, but also, "evidence in aggravation or
mitigation."'', If the judge does not hear such evidence, he can concur with
the agreement conditionally on hearing the representations made to him in
open court.22 Should the judge withdraw his conditional concurrence and
the defendant withdraw his guilty plea, the trial judge is required to recuse
himself. 2 3 Commentary on the rule in the Illinois Practice series cites the
reasoning of the Federal Rules as to why that state prohibits judicial
involvement in plea negotiations.24
A number of other states have either adopted rules or have
established case law that hold differently than the Federal Rules and allow
for limited judicial participation in plea negotiations or participation with
"conditions" attached.25 Oregon has developed a unique and interesting

impose a death sentence, stating that it should be left up to a jury, but stated that he was ninety
percent sure he would impose a sentence of life without parole if the defendant pleaded guilty.
Id. The defendant entered a guilty plea and the trial judge sentenced him to death. Id. The
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial judge's participation in the negotiations rendered the
plea involuntary. Id.at 650.
18 Gibson v. State, 636 S.E.2d 767, 769 (Ga. App. Ct. 2006) (ruling that trial judge
"improperly inserted himself into the plea bargaining process"). The court reasoned that the trial
judge went too far when he informed the defendant, on the record, "Ifyou are asking me will I
give you that same consideration after you have put the state on trial, they have brought in
witnesses at their expense, these citizens have listened to evidence over four or five days, will I
give you the same consideration versus saving the taxpayers money? No." Id.
19 ILL. S. CT. R. 402(d)(1) (2008) (emphasis added).
20 ILL. S. CT.R. 402(d)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
21
22

Id.
Id.

id.
See 5 I11.
Prac. §11:14 (2d ed. 2007) (referring to Federal Rules reasoning for not allowing
judicial involvement in plea negotiations). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. II cmt.
25 See State v. D'Antonio, 877 A.2d 696, 712 (Conn. 2005) (citing State v. Niblack, 596
23

24

A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 1991)) (requiring judge recuse himself from trial after participating in
unsuccessful plea negotiations). The court cited Florida's rules governing judicial participation in
plea negotiations as helpful in working through the issues confronted when allowing judges to
participate in plea discussions. Id. at 715. Illinois follows this rule as well. IL. S. CT. R.
402(d)(2) (2008) (requiring judge to recuse himself should defendant withdraw plea after judicial
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approach to judicial involvement in plea discussions.
In a statute
specifically devoted to "Trial judge participation and duties," any judge
other than the presidingjudge, at the request of the prosecution and the
defense, or at the direction of the presiding judge, is allowed to participate

in plea negotiations.26 The relevant section of the statute further states,
Participation by [a judge other than the presiding judge] in the plea
discussion process shall be advisory, and shall in no way bind the parties. If
no plea is entered pursuant to these discussions, the advice of the
participating judge shall not be reported to the trial judge. If the discussion

results in a plea of guilty or no contest, the parties, if they both agree to do
so, may proceed with the plea before a judge involved in the discussion.
This plea may be entered pursuant to a tentative plea agreement as
provided in subsection (2) to (4) of this section.2 7

Montana, like a number of states, neither expressly allows nor
prohibits trial judges' involvement in plea negotiations. 28

Montana's

Commission Comments on the rule recognize that there are situations in
which such participation is warranted. 29 New York shows a similar "lack
of a clear position" with regard to judicial participation in plea
negotiations.30
Pennsylvania, previously having prohibited judges'

participation in plea discussions, amended its rules of criminal procedure in
1995 to permit the practice, noting that
it was amended to "align the rule
31
practice.,
current
of
realities
the
with
Previously having prohibited judicial participation in plea
negotiations, Michigan permits it, but with safeguards in place.32 In People
v. Cobbs,33 the Michigan Supreme Court created a narrowly tailored set of

participation in plea negotiations). See also ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) (2008) (allowing for
judicial participation in plea negotiations with permission of both parties).
26 OR. REV. STAT. § 135.432(l)(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
27 Id.
28 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-211(1) (2007); see also People v. Weaver, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d
742, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating degree of participation varies among judges). There is no
rule in California that prohibits judicial involvement in plea discussions. Id. The courts,
however, have cautioned against it, expressing concerns about coercion and lack of neutrality. Id.
See also State v. Byrd, 407 N.E.2d 1384, 1388 (Ohio 1980) (discouraging judicial participation
and requiring it be "carefully scrutinized" for effect on voluntariness of plea).
29 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-12-211(1) cmt. (1991).
30 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.50 (2008) (neglecting to neither allow nor prohibit judicial
involvement). The commentary goes on to state that New York is more flexible than the federal
rules of criminal procedure with regard to judicial involvement in plea negotiations and the
decision is left to the individual judge. Preiser, Peter, Supp. Prac. Cmt. (2002).
31 PA. R. CRIM. P. 590(B)(1) cmt. (2008).
32 People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Mich. 1993).
33 People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1993).
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rules that a judge participating in plea negotiations must follow.3 4 The
judge cannot initiate participation in the plea discussions; rather, he must
do so at the request of a party involved.35 On the record, the judge must
state the length of the sentence he believes is appropriate given the
infornation available to him at the time.36 The judge is not permitted to
provide alternative sentencing possibilities based on future procedural
choices by the defendant, such as the defendant exercising his right to a

trial by jury.37 An initial sentencing assessment does not bind the judge in
any way, and, in turn, the judge's decision not to sentence the defendant in

accordance with an initial sentencing assessment is not grounds for
automatic recusal.38
Florida, having refused to condemn judicial
39
participation in plea negotiations in 1975 in the case of Davis v. State,

followed Michigan's example and adopted similar, narrowly-tailored rules
to govern the practice.4 °
In Vermont, the state rules of criminal procedure provide that,
"The court shall not participate in any such discussions, unless the
41
proceedings are taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment.
In the case of State v. Davis,42 the Supreme Court of the State explained
that:

Vermont is almost unique in allowing judges to participate
in plea bargaining, taking a position different from both the
federal rule and from the ABA Standards because it has

34 Id.
31 Id. at 212.
36 Id.(emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d at 212.
39 308 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1975).
40 See State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507, 513-514 (Fla. 2000) (providing guidelines for judicial
participation in plea negotiations). The court stated that judicial participation must be limited to
minimize the possibility of coercing the defendant, to ensure that the judge remains neutral, and
to make certain that the public also sees the judge as an impartial party. Id. at 513. The court
went on to state that the judge cannot initiate plea discussions, but can only participate upon the
request of a party. Id. Once a party requests such involvement from the judge, the judge may
discuss sentencing possibilities and comment on those sentences that are proposed. Id.
Furthermore, the judge must inform the defendant that in determining a sentence, the court will
consider victim input along with any other applicable information, emphasizing that such
information may alter the sentence. Id. A record of the plea discussions involving the court must
be kept. Id. at 514. If, after all these steps are taken, the defendant withdraws his guilty plea, the
judge that participated in the plea bargaining is subject to recusal. Id. The court noted that it is
important to emphasize that participation in plea negotiations is left to the discretion of the trial
judge. Id.
41 VT. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(e)(1) (2008) (emphasis added).
42 584 A.2d 1146(Vt. 1990).
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recognized that defendants derive benefits from judges'
input. In difficult cases, where the parties are deadlocked,
43
the judge may be able to help fashion a compromise.
The commentary on the Vermont rule acknowledges the criticism
that allowing participation may cause the defendant to call into question the
judge's role as a neutral decision-maker before a hearing, trial, or
sentencing has occurred, perhaps inducing an innocent defendant to plead
guilty. 44 It also acknowledges that such participation may influence the
judge in his later decisions.
The commentary, however, goes on to state
that there are advantages to the practice, and that the rule rightfully leaves
the decision of whether to participate up to the judge.46 By requiring that a
judge's participation be on the record, there is a later opportunity for a
review of anyone's challenges, including a defendant's claims of prejudice
or unfair influence.4 7
The State of Maine, effective January 1, 2008, amended its Rules
of Criminal Procedure from prohibiting the practice, to now expressly
allowing it: "The court may participate in the negotiation of the specific
terms of the plea agreement at the request of or with the agreement of the
parties.- 4' The advisory note for the rule states that the purposes for such a
change are to:
1) avoid confusion with Me. R. Crim. P. 11A(e) in which
the court is required to disclose its view of an appropriate
sentence in certain negotiated pleas, and 2) promote sound
policy and good judicial case management practice, while
retaining the protection of the due process rights of the
defendant and the prosecutorial role of the attorney for the
State as a member of the Executive Department.49
The variety of ways that other jurisdictions directly address judicial
participation in plea negotiations can serve as a model for Massachusetts to
confront the issue more publicly, and perhaps take a more consistent,
detailed approach, with clear guidelines. Looking at other jurisdictions can
also promote a better understanding of the many issues that arise when a

43 Id. at 1148 (internal citations omitted).
44 VT. R. CRIM. P. I l(e)(l) cmt. (2008).
45 id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 ME. R. CRIM. P. 1IA(a) (2008).

49 ME. R. CRIM. P. 1 IA(a), advisory note (2008).
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judge participates in plea negotiations, and can educate us about how to
best permit it in Massachusetts courts.
1II.

THE STATE OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS

In Massachusetts, Rule 12 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal
Procedure leaves open whether judges are permitted to participate in plea
negotiations. 50 The rule states, in relevant part,
The defendant and defense counsel or the defendant when acting
pro se may engage in discussions with the prosecutor as to any
recommendation to be made to a judge or any other action to be taken by
the prosecutor upon the tender of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a
charged offense or to a lesser included offense.5"
The case law has offered some interpretation and insight regarding
the practice, particularly addressing areas that raise concerns.
A.

Coercion

If the trial or motion judge is actively involved in the plea
negotiations, it may be difficult for the judge to determine the voluntariness
of the defendant's guilty plea. 52 A defendant, particularly in a motion
and/or trial session, may feel an overwhelming amount of pressure to
accept what the trial or motion judge offers as a sentence in exchange for a
plea of guilty. 53 Rejecting an offer of a sentence from the decision-maker
can easily be perceived as a veiled "threat," even where not intended.5 4 As
50 MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12 (2008).
51 MASS. R. CRIM.P. 12(b)(l) (2008).

52 See intra note 62 and accompanying text.
53 See intia note 84-86 and accompanying text.
54 See Commonwealth v. Bowen, 827 N.E.2d 751, 756 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (describing
principle of coercion). "'We wish to emphasize that what is prohibited is punishing a defendant
because he insisted on his right to trial, as opposed to as award of a greater sentence after trial
because the offenses, and the evidence presented at trial, warrant it. There is an important
distinction between what a judge will as opposed to could, award as a sentence, given the
statutory range of sentences." Id. See also Letters v. Commonwealth, 193 N.E.2d 578, 581
(Mass. 1963) (voiding guilty plea induced by judge's threat of increased punishment for
exercising right to trial). The trial judge told defense counsel that the defendant would receive
two life sentences to be served consecutively if he was found guilty of rape charges, but that only
one life sentence would be imposed if the defendant pleaded guilty. Id. at 579. The court further
stated that the defendant's "constitutional right to require the Government to proceed to a
conclusion of the trial and to establish guilt by independent evidence should not be exercised
under the shadow of a penalty. . .To impose upon a defendant such alternatives amounts to
coercion as a matter of law." Id. at 580 (quoting States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)). See also infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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stated in Commonwealth v. Carter,55 "No matter how heinous the offense
charged, how overwhelming the proof of guilt may appear, or how hopeless
the defense, a defendant's right to continue with his trial may not be
violated., 56 A reviewing court will find a due process violation "only by
objective proof that a judge forced a guilty plea by putting the defendant on
notice that
he could expect more severe punishment if he insisted on a trial
57
by jury.
Criticism of judicial involvement certainly revolves around
coercion and also includes related concerns: 1) that there is a "high and
unacceptable risk of coercing a defendant to accept the proposed agreement
and plead guilty; '58 2) that a prohibition on judges' participation would
"protect the integrity of the judicial process; ' ' 59 3) that "a ban preserves the
judge's impartiality after negotiations are completed;, 60 4) that a judge's
participation could create the impression in the defendant that he would not
receive a fair trial or hearing if he were to go before that judge; 6' 5) that
"judicial participation makes it more difficult for the judge to objectively
determine the voluntariness of the plea;, 62 6) that the judge's "promising" a
sentence is inconsistent with the purpose of requiring a pre-sentence
investigation report; 63 and 7) that it does not honor a victim's right to be

heard before a disposition is determined.64
In Commonwealth v. Carter, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals
held that a guilty plea was induced by the presiding judge's improper
threat.65 The trial judge informed the defendant that if he entered a guilty
plea, he would receive a sentence of six years imprisonment, but if he was

"

733 N.E.2d 582 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
Id. at 583.
57 Commonwealth v. Damiano, 441 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
58 U.S. v. Bierd, 217 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting U.S. v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 556
56

(9th Cir. 1992)).
59 U.S. v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 732 (11 th Cir. 1996).
60 id.
61 Damiano, 441 N.E.2d at 1050 n.7.
62 See id.
63 See id.

64 Commonwealth v. Gaumond, No. 98-2813-14-15, 2002 WL 732152, at *4 (Mass. Super.
Ct. April 19, 2002). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B § 3(p) (2008) (indicating victims' right

to be heard in court).
65 See Commonwealth v. Carter, 733 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). See also
Commonwealth v. Bowen, 827 N.E.2d 751, 754 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (describing defendant's
support for his allegation that his guilty plea was coerced). The defendant, eight months after
pleading guilty, claimed that his guilty plea was coerced. Id. He claimed this after his attorney
informed him that during a conference in chambers, the judge stated that if the defendant pleaded
guilty he would be sentenced to eight to ten years in prison, while if he went to trial and was
convicted he would receive a prison sentence of twenty-five to thirty years. Id.
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convicted after a trial, he would receive a sentence of eighteen to twenty
years." The court held that this made the plea involuntary and voidable.6 7
Although a trial judge is permitted to inform defendants of their options
and the ramifications of a decision to enter a guilty plea or proceed to trial,
the trial judge
in Carterwent beyond merely informing the defendant of his
68
options.
In Commonwealth v. Lebon,69 although not involving a guilty plea,
the Massachusetts Court of Appeals reversed a conviction following a jurywaived trial after it determined that the defendant's waiver of his right to a
jury trial was coerced.7 0 The trial judge stated in a conference in chambers
before the start of a jury trial that if the jury should return a verdict of
guilty, he would sentence the defendant to committed incarceration, but if
the defendant chose a jury-waived trial and was found guilty, he would not
impose a committed sentence. 71 Lebon then chose to waive his right to be
tried by a jury, the judge found him guilty, and the defendant was given a
suspended sentence of six months in a house of correction with a period of
probation.72 On appeal, Lebon claimed the judge coerced him into giving
up his right to a jury trial7 3 The court held that "the judge, by offering
substantially lighter punishment in return for the defendant not electing a
jury trial so dampened the defendant's right to a trial by jury as to deprive
him of it," and reversed the conviction. 4
In Commonwealth v. Damiano,75 the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals reviewed the trial judge's involvement in plea negotiations in a
case in which the judge accepted the defendant's guilty pleas to twentythree indictments and sentenced him to twenty-three concurrent life
sentences.7 6 The prosecution had participated in recommending and

66

Carter,733 N.E.2d at 584.

67

Id. at 583.

68

id.

69 643 N.E.2d 45 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
70

Id. at 47.

71 Id. at 46-47.
72

Id. at 46 (describing case proceedings). After the defendant decided to waive his right to a

trial by jury, the judge engaged in a colloquy with the defendant, asking him whether anyone
forced him to give up his right to trial by jury, to which he answered, "No." Id. at 47. The court
considered whether, as the dissent stated, in doing so, the defendant gave up his right to argue that
he was coerced. Id.The court decided that the defendant had not given up this right, disagreeing
with the dissent's statement that, "a deal is a deal," and responding, "A deal is not always a deal
when one side has all the cards." Id.
71 Id. at 46.
74 Lebon, 643 N.E.2d at 46.
75 441 N.E.2d 1046 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
76 Id.at 1048.
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obtaining a reduced sentence for Damiano's co-defendant in exchange for
cooperation with the police and offered to agree to a similar sentence for
Damiano. 77
Following this offer from the prosecution, during an
unrecorded conference in chambers, the trial judge expressed his
appreciation for the co-defendant's cooperation and indicated that the
defendant may be given similar consideration if he cooperated with
police. 78 The trial judge further stated that an eighteen to twenty-year79
sentence could be imposed pending the defendant's cooperation.
Damiano refused to cooperate, pled guilty, and was sentenced to twentythree concurrent life terms in prison."
The defendant filed a motion
challenging his conviction and sentence on the grounds that the trial judge
coerced his pleas.8 '
The Court of Appeals held that it was permissible for the trial
judge to discuss sentencing alternatives, and that he did nothing
inappropriate in not committing himself to a particular sentence in
advance.8 2 Therefore, there was no basis for concluding that the trial judge
had coerced the defendant's guilty plea. 83 The court noted that a certain
degree of coercion, in the form of psychological or emotional pressure, is
inherent to any system that asks a person to forego certain rights in order to
be spared certain penalties, but that "the possibility that a greater penalty
will result from a jury trial than from the entry of a guilty plea has not been
found to infringe impermissibly on the right to a jury trial. 84 Courts have
interpreted the "impermissible" line of coercion when a defendant is "so
gripped by fear ...or hope of leniency that he does not, or could not, with
the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against
the advantages of pleading guilty." 85 The Damiano court reasoned that the
defendant was not subject to anything more than the "normal pressures

77

Id.

Id. at 1049.
79 Id.
SODamiano, 441 N.E.2d at 1049.
7X

x8id.
x2 Id. at 1051. See also Commonwealth v. Carrasco, No. 07-P-1024, 2008 WL 5047686, at
*2 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 26, 2008) (describing appropriate judicial participation in plea

negotiations). In Carrasco, the appeals court found that the trial judge retained his role as a
neutral arbiter in his involvement in plea discussions. Id. During discussions with attorneys, the
judge allowed counsel to present their respective sentencing requests and their arguments in
support of such requests. Id.at n.2. The judge informed the defendant of his options, and of the
potential effects on sentencing of his decision whether to plead guilty. Id.
N3

Id.

84

Id.(quoting Commonwealth v. LeRoy, 380 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1978)).

85 Damiano, 441 N.E.2d at 1051 (quoting Commonwealth v. Tirrell, 416 N.E.2d 1357 (Mass.

1981)).
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intrinsic to the plea bargaining process. '86 Additionally, the court
referenced further support for its conclusion in the trial judge's recorded
hearing, which made it possible to ascertain whether the defendant's pleas
were made knowingly and voluntarily.87
In a footnote, however, the court made it clear that it did not wish
its opinion to be construed as encouraging a judge's participation in plea
negotiations: "While the record demonstrates that the defendant's pleas
were voluntary, we hasten to add that nothing in this opinion should be
construed as encouraging judicial participation in plea negotiations. 8 8 In
the same footnote, the court cited to United States v. Werker,89 emphasizing
that by not participating, a judge will: 1) avoid claims by a defendant that
he was coerced into guilty pleas, 2) not negotiate the terms of a sentence
that the judge himself proposed, 3) prevent motions for recusal because the
judge had too much information regarding the defendant's guilt and
expressed an opinion about punishment, and 4) discourage the defendant
from recanting his plea through a collateral attack. 90 The court concluded
that there was no presumption of coercion based on a likelihood of
vindictiveness because of the possibility of greater punishment after a jury
trial or failing to cooperate with police. 9'
The footnote, however,
demonstrates the reluctance of courts to place clear and predictable limits
92
on the practice.
Other state courts have voiced concerns in their opinions about
coercion of defendants. 93 These have led some jurisdictions to completely
eliminate judicial participation in plea negotiations, while others, like
Massachusetts, have allowed it, but cautioned against its use where it may
94
Illinois courts, for example, make clear their distaste
result in coercion.
for any variation on the procedure outlined in their rules prohibiting
judicial participation in plea negotiations:

86 Damiano, 441 N.E.2d at 1051.

87 Id. at 1051-52. (citing record for reasons showing that the defendant was not coerced).
Damiano's age and mental capacity were addressed. Id. The court quoted various points at
which the defendant acknowledged his participation in the crime and the range of the judge's
sentencing power. Id.
" Id. at 1052 n.13.
89 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1976).
90 Damiano, 441 N.E.2d at 1052 n.13.
91 Id.at 1052.
92 Id. at 1052 n.13.
93 See State v. McCray, 87 P.3d 369, 372 (Kan. App. Ct. 2004) (permitting judicial
involvement in plea negotiations). Allowing such participation, the court stated, was conditional
upon there being no coercion of the defendant. Id. The court stated in dicta, however, that the
better practice is for a judge not to participate in plea negotiations. Id.
94 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.

16

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIV

In the acceptable procedure, petitioner makes his decision

before the trial judge makes his; hence, no influence is
being exerted on petitioner by the trial judge at the time
petitioner is making his decision. On the other hand, in the
procedure in the instant case, the trial judge made his
decision before petitioner made his, and that sequence
created an inherent coercion on petitioner in making his
decision. The inherent coercion consists of this: since the
participating judge is the trial judge, petitioner fears what
will happen to him sentence-wise, should he refuse the
judge's own recommendation and persist in being tried on
his plea of not guilty, whether by jury or in a bench trial. 95
Maine, even though expressly allowing for judicial participation in

plea negotiations, cautions against coercion as their primary concern in the
advisory notes to their criminal rules. 9 6 To mitigate against the risks of
coercion, the advisory note recommends that during plea negotiations the
judge should:
1) avoid suggestions to defendants or defense counsel that

the refusal to enter a plea may lead to a higher sentence
than otherwise may be appropriate if there is a conviction

after trial, and 2) avoid suggestions to prosecutors that
failure to agree to a plea may result in dismissal of a
95 People v. Bannister, 309 N.E.2d 279, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (describing issues with
judicial participation in plea negotiations). In Bannister, the trial judge followed a routine
practice when plea negotiations were sought on the day of trial, to meet in chambers with the
prosecutor and defense counsel, look at the evidence against the defendant, listen to the
prosecutor's recommended sentence, consider matters in aggravation and mitigation, defense
counsel's recommended sentence, and then the judge would make his own recommendation as to
sentence, should the defendant plead guilty. Id. at 281-82. See also Gordon v. State, 577 P.2d
701 (Alaska 1978) (stating purpose of prohibition on judicial participation is to avoid coercion);
State v. Sugg, 456 S.E.2d 469, 487 (W. Va. 1995) (listing primary reason for prohibiting
participation as coercion); State v. Dimmit, 665 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D. 2003) (giving coercion as
first reason for absolute prohibition).
96 See Matter of Cox, 553 A.2d 1255, 1257 (Me. 1989) (reiterating former rule prohibiting
judicial involvement in plea negotiations). The opinion in this case issued when the Maine Rules
of Criminal Procedure prohibited judicial involvement in plea negotiations. Id. The court stated
that, "four interests may be compromised when a judge assumes the role of a plea negotiatorthose of the defendant, the system of justice, the prosecutor and the judiciary." Id. See also
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) court comment to 1999 amendment (cautioning judges to avoid
coercive behavior of any kind); State v. Jordan, 672 P.2d 169, 174 (Ariz. 1983) (citing reasons for
prohibiting judicial involvement in plea negotiations). The opinion in this case was written prior
to Arizona's amendment to its rules of criminal procedure. Id The court specifically cited
coercion by the judge as support for the state's not allowing judicial participation in plea
negotiations. Id.
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be

appropriate if there is a conviction
after trial, or adverse
97
consequences in other cases.

B.

Vindictiveness

The concepts of coercion and vindictiveness differ. As explained
in a footnote in Damiano:

Vindictiveness is retaliation for rightful action taken in the
past (e.g., the imposition of a heavier sentence upon a
verdict of guilt than would have been imposed upon a plea

of guilty). Coercion is the use of a threat to induce action.
The two concepts have at least one feature in common,
since one may attempt coercion by threatening to take
action which, if taken, would be vindictive.98

Vindictiveness is not implicated in a sentencing decision unless a
defendant is punished for doing something he had a right to do. 99 For

example, it is fundamental that a defendant may not be punished for
exercising his right to a trial.100 A judge's involvement in the plea
bargaining process, however, is not a per se violation of a defendant's
rights.'

1

The analysis to determine whether a judge has acted in a vindictive

02
manner is set forth in the Supreme Court case of Alabama v. Smith,1

which

overruled

a

more

broadly-stated

presumption

of judicial

vindictiveness established originally in North Carolina v. Pearce. 03 The
97 ME. R. CRIM. P. 1 IA, advisory note (2008).
98 Commonwealth v. Damiano, 441 N.E.2d 1046, 1052 n.14 (Mass. 1982) (defining terms
and addressing questions of coercion and vindictiveness in separately designated sections of
opinion).
99 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
100See Commonwealth v. Ravenell, 612 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Mass. 1993) (describing
defendant's right to trial in context of vindictiveness allegations against judge). The court stated,
"'Plainly, a defendant ... may not be punished for exercising his right to trial and, therefore, the
fact that he has done so should be given no weight in determining his sentence.' It logically
follows that, when the severity of a sentence has been increased in retaliation for the defendant's
decision to go to trial rather than plead guilty, the sentence must be vacated." Id. See also
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 543 N.E.2d 22, 24 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (stating that when
defendant is punished for exercising right to trial "error enters the picture").
101 Commonwealth v. Damiano, 441 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
102 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
103 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruledby490 U.S. 794 (1989).
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Court distinguished Smith from Pearce, making it clear that Pearce
addressed the issue of vindictiveness when a defendant is granted a retrial
and, following that conviction, receives a longer sentence than in the first
trial. 0 4 Smith, on the other hand, addressed vindictiveness specifically
when a judge issues a harsher sentence following trial than originally
imposed on a guilty plea that was vacated.'0 5 The Smith Court resolved the
differences between the two circumstances by pointing out that with a
reconviction after the two trials, a similar set of facts will be available to a
judge imposing a requirement for the judge to show why a harsher sentence
was imposed after the second trial.10 6 A trial following a vacated guilty
plea, however, will reveal additional evidence and circumstances about the
case to the judge that were never developed during negotiations or the
guilty plea process, as they would in a trial, and, therefore,
a harsher
10 7
sentence alone does not raise a presumption of vindictiveness.
Smith narrowed the presumption of vindictiveness in Pearce,
establishing a more refined rule for determining whether judicial
vindictiveness exists after a vacated guilty plea and trial. 0 8 A presumption
of vindictiveness will only exist in circumstances in which there is a
"reasonable likelihood" that the harsher sentence is a result of judicial
vindictiveness. 0 9 In the cases where this condition is met, the burden of
proof shifts to the government to show the absence of vindictiveness." 10 If
a reasonable likelihood is not established, however, then the burden of
proof remains on the defendant to establish that actual vindictiveness
occurred.''' This is unlike a circumstance in which a defendant claims he
was coerced into giving up a2 right, as the burden always remains on the
defendant to prove as much."
A "reasonable likelihood" that harsher sentences were the result of
vindictiveness does not exist in cases in which de novo review by a
different judge or jury occurred."1 3 Cases in which de novo review
104

Id. at 799.
,5t. at 797.

Id. at 802.
07 i. at 801.
lox Smith, 490 U.S. at 799.
109 Id.
'0

]

/oId.

11 Ild.
112 Commonwealth v. Damiano, 441 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (requiring
"objective proof' that judge threatened defendant with higher sentence if he did not plead guilty).
113 See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (refusing to apply presumption
when harsher sentence imposed by higher court reviewing evidence for first time); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26 (1973) (declining to apply presumption when higher sentence
imposed by second jury).
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occurred can, according to the Smith Court, be reconciled with those in
sentence was imposed after a trial that followed a vacated
which a greater
1 14
plea.
guilty
Massachusetts has further explained this rule and applied it to cases
in which the judge's involvement in plea negotiations raised the issue of
vindictiveness.' 15 In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 16 the trial judge stated on
the record, after closing arguments, that the defendant rejected an offer of a
six to nine-year prison sentence if he pleaded guilty." 7 The jury convicted
Johnson, who then received a nine to fifteen-year sentence from the same
judge. 118

114Smith, 490 U.S. at 801.
115See Commonwealth v. Ford, 626 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (finding no
"reasonable likelihood" of vindictiveness established). In Ford, during the conference in
chambers the judge suggested that the defendant had a "wicked" record and that going to trial
would be a "waste of time" and an "academic exercise." Id. The judge indicated that if the
defendant pleaded guilty he would likely be sentenced to "twelve years or something," however,
if he chose to go to trial the defendant would likely be sentenced to twenty to forty years. Id. The
judge "mitigated" the vindictive effects of these statements by saying that he was not "twisting
any arms" and had "nothing better to do than try this case." Id. The defendant was convicted
after a trial and sentenced to fifteen-twenty years. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Ravenell, 612
N.E.2d 1142, 1144 (Mass. 1993) (holding no presumption of vindictiveness). In Ravenell, the
judge stated in a conference in chambers that her sentence after trial would be approximately
twelve to fifteen years, and the sentence she would impose after a guilty plea would be nine to
twelve years. ld. at 1143. The reviewing court found that this did not establish a presumption of
vindictiveness. Id.at 1144; Commonwealth v. Carney, 576 N.E.2d 691, 695 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991) (finding no presumption of vindictiveness). The defendant claimed that the judge's
comment "you might do a lot better with me before the trial than after" - constituted a threat to
punish the defendant for exercising his right to trial. Id. at 695. The reviewing court, however,
found no other evidence in support of the defendant's argument. Id. Additional factors the court
considered in support of its ruling that the judge was not punishing the defendant for going to trial
were that the judge: 1)postponed sentencing to await a pre-sentence report "to effect full and fair
arguments thereon and to allow the tensions of trial to abate", and 2) imposed sentences that were
significantly more lenient than what the prosecutor recommended. Id.
116543 N.E.2d 22 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
117Id.at 24 (describing defendant's allegations of judicial vindictiveness in sentencing). In
Johnson, the relevant conference in chambers between the judge and the attorneys, some of which
was off the record, did not occur until after the close of all evidence and the attorneys' final
arguments were heard. Id. Before his charge to the jury, the judge stated on the record, "All
right, I just want to put on the record that I made an offer to you, to your client relative to
numbers six to nine. Six to nine is the number, and we'll put this on the record, and your client's
rejected that." Id. The jury convicted the defendant on all six of his indictments and the judge
sentenced him to concurrent nine to fifteen years in prison. Id. In finding that there was no
vindictiveness in the judge's sentencing, the court considered, among other things, that the judge
did not indicate in any way that the defendant would be punished more severely for choosing to
exercise his right to trial, or express any disapproval with the defendant not pleading guilty. Id. at
25. The court further stated, "We think the indicia of objective and legally acceptable sentencing
criteria far outweigh the one indicator of vindictive sentencing, i.e., that the sentence imposed
was greater than the one offered for a plea." Id.
" " Id. at 24.
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Following unsuccessful appeals in the Massachusetts courts,
Johnson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court, which was denied. 1 9 On appeal from this denial, Johnson claimed
that the Pearcepresumption of vindictiveness should apply and that his due
process rights were violated. 20 The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that the Pearce presumption was not triggered, reasoning
that the timing of the judge's statement at the conclusion of the trial and the
fact that the judge did not express displeasure with Johnson's refusal to
accept the plea dispelled any need for a presumption of vindictiveness. 121
The court further reasoned that a guilty plea22 may permissibly be a
consideration resulting in leniency in sentencing.
Affirming the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, the court also
held that Johnson did not meet his burden of showing actual
vindictiveness. 123 The court in Johnson set out factors to consider on the
issue of vindictiveness, including: (1) evidence of pressure on the
defendant to accept a plea, or of the judge's displeasure in the defendant's
refusal of the offer; (2) the severity of the sentence in relation to the
sentence authorized by statute; and (3) the Commonwealth's recommended
sentence.
In support of his argument that the judge's statement regarding
sentencing was an implicit threat that he would receive a harsher sentence
124
if he exercised his right to trial, Johnson cited United States v. Crocker
and Longval v. Meachum, 125 in which the respective courts determined that
there was a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness and applied the
presumption.126 In Crocker, at the start of the second day of trial, the judge
stated to defense counsel in chambers, "I think imposing upon the time and
resources of the Court to try a case which should not have been tried is an
imposition which deserves consideration when it comes time for me to
sentence and I will do so.' 27 In Longval, near the close of the
prosecution's case, the trial judge stated to defense counsel, "I strongly
suggest that you ask your client to consider a plea, because, if the jury
returns a verdict of guilty, I might be disposed to impose a substantial
prison sentence. You know that I am capable of doing that because you
119 Johnson v. Vose, 927 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991).
120 Id.at 11.
121 Id.at 12.
122 Id.at 13 (quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989)).
123 Johnson, 927 F.2d at 14.
124 788 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1986).
125 693 F.2d 236 (st Cir. 1982).
126 Crocker, 788 F.2d at 809; Longval, 693 F.2d at 237.
127 Crocker, 788 F.2d at 808.
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know of the sentences in the previous trial.' 28 The court in Johnson,
however, did not accept the defendant's argument and distinguished the
circumstances in Johnson from Longval and Crocker on the grounds that
the judges' comments in those cases were made in the middle of trial, as
opposed to at the conclusion, and that the comments suggested the judges
if the defendants chose to continue with the trial,
would be displeased
29
unlike in Johnson.'
The defendant in Johnson also argued that because the judge had
no new evidence or other information before him from the time of the
comment until sentencing, the higher sentence imposed indicated a
reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness and required that the court apply
the Pearce presumption.1 30 The court stated that, even assuming the judge
had no new and relevant information, the defendant's willingness to accept
responsibility and admit guilt is a proper factor to be considered in
sentencing.'3' The court concluded that there was nothing in the record that
indicated a "reasonable likelihood" of vindictiveness, the Pearce
presumption was not triggered, and the defendant failed to meet his burden
to show actual vindictiveness.' 32 The court stated, "[w]here a shorter term
of imprisonment was promised in exchange for a plea of guilty, without
any indication of undue pressure or threats of retaliation, we think it more
reasonable to view the lower sentence as an offer of leniency than to view
the higher sentence as punishment for refusing to plead."' 3 3
Other states also have addressed the issue of judicial vindictiveness
in sentencing.134 Florida courts have regularly considered this, specifically
with regard to judicial involvement in plea negotiations. 135 One of the
ways that Florida addresses this issue is through restrictions on judicial

128Longval, 693 F.2d at 237.
129 Johnson, 927 F.2d at 12.
"' Id. at 11-13.
131 Id. at 13.
132 Id. at 14.
131 Id. at 13.

134 See Hicks v. State, 729 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2000) (distinguishing case from Pearceand
Smith). The court declined to apply a presumption of vindictiveness. Id. at 147; State v. Nelson,
999 P.2d 1161, 1168-69 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing standard for presumption of judicial
vindictiveness); LaVallee v. Perrin, 466 A.2d 932, 936 (N.H. 1983) (finding no presumption of
vindictiveness with no judicial participation in plea negotiations); Castleberry v. State, 704
S.W.2d 21, 26-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Ehl v. Estelle, 656 F.2d 166, 168-69 (5th Cir.
1981)) (describing relationship between vindictiveness and judicial involvement in plea
negotiations).
135See generallv Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142 (Fla. 2003); State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507
(Fla. 2000); Charles v. State, 816 So.2d 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Mitchell v. State, 521
So.2d 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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participation inplea negotiations.
In describing the restriction that the trial judge could not initiate
plea discussions but could only discuss potential plea agreements reached
by and between the parties, the court in Warner made clear that the
question for the trial judge from the defendant's perspective would be,
"Knowing what you know today, what do you think the sentence would be
if the defendant plead guilty, as charged?"'137 The emphasis on the
evidence available to the judge at that particular time - that is, at the time
the judge engaged in discussions about a guilty plea - would help the
defendant understand that if additional incriminating or aggravating
evidence and circumstances should arise at trial and a guilty verdict is
returned, it could result in a higher sentence. 38 This could help mitigate
allegations of vindictiveness should a harsher sentence be imposed than
was discussed surrounding a guilty plea. Another restriction on judicial
participation in plea negotiations, as discussed in Warner, is that the judge
must "neither state nor imply alternative sentencing possibilities which
hinge upon future procedural choices, such as the exercise of a defendant's
right to trial. 39 Such a requirement, if followed, also avoids the risk, or
even the perception, of judicial vindictiveness.
A good example of Florida courts minimizing the risk of
vindictiveness is the case of Mitchell v. State, 140 where the defendant
rejected an offer of a sentence by the trial judge on a guilty plea and instead
exercised his right to trial. 14 1 The trial judge went on the record after the
defendant rejected the plea stating, "The offer made was based upon entry
of a plea at this time... Obviously, the court's position would be could
very well be - entirely different at the conclusion of the trial should
appropriate motions be filed."'142 When the defendant was convicted, the
trial judge imposed a harsher sentence and provided written reasons for the
variation in sentencing. '43 When the defendant challenged the higher
sentence, the reviewing
court found no presumption of vindictiveness or
44
1
vindictiveness.
actual
In response to these rules and an interpretation by other Florida
136 Wilson, 845 So.2d at

151 (outlining restrictions on judicial participation in plea

negotiations as described in Warner).
137 Warner, 762 So.2d at 514 (emphasis added).
138 See in/ra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
139 Id.

140 521 So.2d 185 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1988).
''

142
143

Id. at 186.
Id.

Id.
141 Id. at 190.
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cases indicating that Warner created a presumption of vindictiveness when
a harsher sentence is imposed after the judge participates in plea
negotiations, Wilson v. State 45 held that such a presumption was not
mandated.146 The court in Wilson went further, stating that a presumption
of vindictiveness when a judge is involved in plea negotiations would
"diminish the likelihood that the trial judge would participate in plea
discussions at a defendant's request," potentially working to the detriment
Wilson, while using the "reasonable likelihood"
of the defendant. 47
standard as employed in Massachusetts, went on to apply a totality of the
to determine whether the presumption of vindictiveness
circumstances test
148
was established.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these cases.
Allegations of both coercion and vindictiveness often arise when judges'
comments, tone and/or posture during the course of plea negotiations are
intended or could be interpreted as discouraging or punishing the defendant
for exercising his constitutional right to trial. 149 Timing can also be an
important issue when a judge makes a statement regarding resolution of a
case by way of a guilty plea. 50 Additionally, certain circumstances create
an increased likelihood of vindictiveness, and perhaps even a "reasonable
likelihood" of vindictiveness, resulting in the presumption. 5' These arise
when the same judge who discussed the guilty plea then imposes a harsher
and is unable to cite specific and
sentence after hearing similar evidence
52
so.1
doing
for
reasons
justifiable

141 845 So.2d 142 (Fla. 2003).
146 Id. at 152.
147 id.

148 Id. (describing factors additional to those considered in Massachusetts). The court stated
that other factors to be considered include: 1) whether the trial judge initiated plea discussions, 2)
whether the trial judge failed to act as an impartial arbiter by encouraging the defendant to accept
a plea, or by indicating that a harsher sentence could be imposed based on the defendant's future
procedural decisions. Id. at 156. See also supra note 115 (describing factors considered in
Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Carney). See also Charles v. State, 816 So.2d 731, 735
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (describing factors considered in addressing whether presumption of
vindictiveness was established). The court there considered: 1) whether the judge was involved
in plea negotiations; 2) the discrepancies in the sentencing; 3) the information available to the
judge at the time of the initial plea offer; and 4) whether there were factors allowing for the
discrepancy in sentencing. Id.; State v. D'Antonio, 877 A.2d 696, 715-16 (Conn. 2005) (citing
factors enumerated in Wilson).
149 See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
150 Id.

151 See supranotes 105-1 11 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
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III. OFF-THE-RECORD CONFERENCES
One of the most serious criticisms of judicial participation in the
resolution of criminal cases short of trial is that conferences between
counsel and a judge are often conducted in a judge's chambers, away from
public view and without being "on the record." Persuasive criticism in
cases, court rules, commentary, and scholarly publications make clear that
discussions with the judge should generally be held in open court, or, with
the defendant's consent, in chambers, and always on the record. 153 This
helps avoid the appearance that the attorneys and the judge are hiding
something, engaging in "backroom" horsetrading, or that the case is being
"resolved" inappropriately; as importantly, it helps avoid disputes over
what was discussed between counsel and the judge.1 54 If these discussions
do not occur in open court or if they
are off the record, then there is no
55
control imposed by the public eye.1
When such negotiations are kept private, there is also the risk that
the judge is not, or at least creates the appearance of not being, neutral and
impartial. 56 If the discussions are not on the record, it would be difficult to
establish with any certainty what was said in the conference, and invites a
"swearing contest" - the proverbial "he said, she said" - between counsel
and the judge.157 The ABA standards make clear that it is not enough to
state for the record that a conference concerning plea negotiations was held
off the record; rather, the substance of the discussion must also be stated.1 58
153 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
154 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
155 See Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 2007) (proving defamation
against Boston Herald regarding story about judge's comments during unrecorded chamber

conference).
156

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (promoting confidence in the

judiciary). The rule requires that a judge, "act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Id. See also People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d
834, 839 (Mich. 1982) (describing goals of court in limiting but allowing judicial participation in

plea negotiations). The court in Killebrew stated that limits on judicial participation were
necessary to ". . . retain the function of the judge as a neutral arbiter, and to preserve the public
perception of the judge as an impartial dispenser ofjustice." Id.
157 See Commonwealth v. Lebon, 643 N.E.2d 45 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (referring to alleged
coercive statement by judge to defendant). The court stated, "There was no stenographic record
of the lobby conference. The parties prepared an agreed statement of what had been said in the
lobby conference ... Although the judge did not expressly 'approve' the agreed statement, he
allowed a motion to expand the trial record to include the statement. We think that amounts to a
de facto approval of the agreed statement." Id. at 46 n.1. See also Cripps v. State, 137 P.3d 1187,
1191 (Nev. 2006) (stating court "unable to objectively analyze" judicial participation because of
insufficient record); infra note 161 and accompanying text.
158 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.3(d) (3d
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Jurisdictions that openly discuss judicial involvement in plea
negotiations have also addressed the recording of negotiations involving
the trial judge. In cases where the trial judge was involved in negotiations
that were recorded, state appellate courts have found the record of critical
importance in reviewing defendants' allegations, such as coercion or lack
of impartiality.1 59
A number of states have made recording a

requirement. 160
The failure of trial judges to record judicial conferences has posed
problems for reviewing courts. 161 In Commonwealth v. Serino,162 the

ed. 1999) (indicating, unfortunately, in the authors' view, judges' participation in plea
negotiations need not be recorded verbatim). The rule does, however, suggest that a record of the
discussion must be made as soon after the discussion as possible. Id. See also VT. R. CRIM. P.
Il(e)( 1) (2008) (requiring that plea discussion involving a judge be recorded by a court reporter
or recording equipment). Although some have argued that there may be practical reasons for
holding conferences in chambers off the record, for example, that the court reporter, after lengthy
proceedings. is unable to come into chambers with the judge and attorneys and not benefit from a
break; indeed and understandably, court reporters rely on these recesses to "catch their breath"
and gather their thoughts, and it would be detrimental to them to force them to go from trial to the
judge's chamber to record the conferences as well. They are, after all, the only court employees
who must repeat every word everyone utters in the courtroom. As the applicable Vermont rule,
for example, makes clear, however, judges could use recording equipment to ensure that
conversation in chambers is recorded verbatim, and can then make the tape a part of the record in
the case.
159 State v. D'Antonio, 877 A.2d 696, 713 (Conn. 2005) (judge's recorded comments
made it
possible to determine whether judge lacked impartiality in plea discussions); State v. Niblack,
596 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 1991) ("available record" gave no indication that judge participating in
negotiations coerced defendant).
160Cripps v. State, 137 P.3d 1187, 1191 (Nev. 2006) (prohibiting
all off-the-record
discussion of plea negotiations between the parties and the judge). The Nevada Supreme Court,
though limiting participation to a judge stating whether or not he agreed with the sentence
recommendation presented to him by the parties, required that the judge place the conversation on
the record and have it transcribed. Id; State v. Warner, 762 So.2d 507, 514 (Fla. 2000) (stating,
"A record must be made of all plea discussions involving the court."). The court indicates that
the judge may state on the record the length of the sentence they feel is appropriate considering
the information available to them at the time. Id. The court also made clear that if the prosecutor
offers to reduce the charges against the defendant if he pleads guilty, the judge may state an
appropriate sentence for the reduced charge on the record, and that any plea discussions involving
the court should be recorded. Id.; VT. R. CRiM. P. 1 l(e)(1) (2008) (prohibiting judicial
involvement in plea discussions unless discussions are taken down by a court reporter or
recording equipment). It is interesting that now in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has
made clear that police officers should record custodial interrogations, in part to minimize
questions about whether incriminating statements and confessions were obtained voluntarily. See
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 529 (Mass. 2004) (recognizing benefits to
recording statements or confessions made by suspect to police during custodial interrogations).
The court in DiGiambattistaheld that if incriminating statements or confessions were alleged by
police but not recorded, the jury, at the defendant's request, should be instructed by the court to
evaluate the statement with caution. Id. at 532. The court noted that failure to record the
interrogation resulted in "expenditure of significant judicial resources." Id. at 529.
161 State v. McCray, 87 P.3d 369, 372 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (relying on judge's testimony

26

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIV

Supreme Judicial Court did not accept the Commonwealth's suggestion
that the trial court had ruled on the voluntariness of the defendant's
statements in an unrecorded conference in chambers.163 In pointed dicta,
64
the court reiterated the court's comments in Commonwealth v. Fanelli,
and recommended that conferences held in chambers be recorded:
The Commonwealth suggests that the judge may have
done so in an unrecorded lobby conference. Neither the
defendant nor the Commonwealth requested that the
conference be recorded, and the Commonwealth may not
now rely on any such suggestion. We again 65
recommend
that unrecorded lobby conferences be avoided.1
In a more recent Massachusetts civil case arising out of a rape
prosecution, Murphy v. Boston Herald,Inc., a failure to record conferences
in chambers resulted in a trial judge filing a defamation suit against the
Boston Herald for publishing reports of damaging comments about the
victim, allegedly made by the judge during off-the-record conferences in
chambers. This led the 66court to make a strong recommendation in favor of
recording conferences. 1
An argument occasionally heard in favor of holding conferences in
chambers off the record is that attorneys, and perhaps the judge, are thereby
"free" to be more "candid" about the case and the parties; the attorneys
may "feel free," behind closed doors and without a recording, to express,

about plea negotiations); People v. Bannister, 309 N.E.2d 279, 281-82 (Il. App. Ct. 1974)
(relying on testimony of assistant public defender regarding plea negotiations); Commonwealth v.
Serino, 765 N.E.2d 237, 241 n.2 (Mass. 2002) (addressing suggestion of Commonwealth that
judge made voluntariness ruling in chambers). The court indicated that the Commonwealth was
unable to rely on this suggestion that the judge made such a ruling in chambers because the
conference was not recorded. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Bowen, 827 N.E.2d 751, 753 n.2
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (indicating judge's remarks during participation in plea negotiations were
central to appeal). The defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea based on allegations of
coercion, eight months after pleading guilty. Id. at 754. Because the lobby conferences were not
recorded, the appeals court had to rely on the affidavits of the attorneys present and the trial
judge's memorandum of decision. Id. Although the court denied the defendant's motion for a
new trial, and remanded the case for further proceedings, the court stated, "findings are necessary,
at the least, as to what was said by this judge in connection with potential sentencing.I.." Id. at
757. See also Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 758 n.15 (Mass. 2007) (stressing
scope of unfortunate consequences from not recording conference in chambers).
162 765 N.E.2d 237 (Mass. 2002).
161 Id. at 241.
164 590 N.E.2d 186 (Mass. 1992).
165 Id. at 241 n.2; see also Fanelli, 590 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Mass. 1992) (noting that, "if a
lobby conference is held, the better practice is to record it.").
166 Id. at 758 n.15.
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for example, that the defendant or alleged victim is "stubborn," difficult, or
unrealistic; that "they" do not really understand the criminal justice system
and the case like "we do;" and, counsel may be more forthcoming about the
weaknesses or strengths of their case. 167 Probation officers may also be
more candid about matters that affect the supervision of a defendant if the
discussion occurs in chambers, off the record, and it is said that the
"openness" of such discussion, in chambers and off the record, may aid the
judge in his sentencing determination. The discussion in the courtroom
may take a significantly longer amount of time, delaying other matters; and
some argue it may be more efficient to have conferences in chambers
because on the bench there needs to be a court reporter, other court
personnel, and, in many cases, an interpreter for the defendant, victim, or
their families. 168 Moreover, claim these proponents, there may be issues
that are better discussed not in public, but in the privacy of a judge's
chambers; for example, sensitive cases involving minors.
It is inconceivable that such claims carry any weight today, if they
ever did. The notion that in order to properly resolve a case, or that it is so
critical that cases be disposed of by guilty pleas, that it is appropriate and
essential for "free-wheeling" off-the-record, do-not-hold-back and sayalmost-what-you-want conferences in chambers, is part of the reason the
public loses faith, trust, and confidence in the justice system. Not only is
such an approach unfair to the parties, it is also arguably unethical; and it is
doubtful that it is effective or efficient.
A.

Right to Confrontation

Furthering the concern about off-the-record conferences,
defendants have, albeit infrequently, alleged that they were deprived of the
right to confrontation. In Commonwealth v. Fanelli, the defendant claimed
that his absence from a conference in chambers with the judge about a
sentence violated his due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, and violated his right "to be present at all critical
stages of the proceedings" under Rule 18 of the Massachusetts Rules of
167 Such so-called "candid" discussions could be considered violations of the Model Rules of
Prof1I Conduct R. 1.6 (2009), regarding confidentiality of client information, and the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct R. 1.2 (2007), requiring that a judge, "act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."
CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
168 See U.S. v. Mercedes-Amparo, 980 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1992) (discussing efficiency of
plea bargaining, but need for safeguards because defendant waives constitutional rights).
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Criminal Procedure. 169 Because the defendant had not objected at the
time, the court did not have to reach the claim; nonetheless, the court went
on to note that the defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by his
absence from the conference.' 70 The Supreme Judicial Court noted in dicta
that "if a lobby conference is held, the better practice is to record it, and
provide a copy of the recording to 'lthe
defendant on request, so that the
' 7
defendant may know what was said. 1
B.

PrematurelyIndicatingSentence with InadequateInjormation

Another criticism is that if a judge participates in plea bargaining,
he may be prematurely committing himself to a sentence short of all
necessary information. In a chambers conference, the judge is unlikely to
hear the attorneys' full arguments in support of their sentence
recommendations. 172 The judge also may not have the benefit of a pre-

sentence report from probation, police reports, psychiatric or other
evaluations, grand jury minutes, or other information that may shed light on
the defendant's background and character, details of his role in the
offenses, as well as the seriousness and nature
of the crime, its impact on
1 73
the victims, and other relevant considerations.

There are numerous circumstances in which the judge conferencing
a case in chambers should step back and take the opportunity to see all
relevant documents, as well as hear more comprehensive arguments
regarding an appropriate sentence. 174 Even though, arguably, there may be

169 Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 590 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Mass. 1992); see also State v. Triplett,
No. 69237, 1997 WL 64051, at *3 (Oh. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1997) (indicating defendant should be
present at resentencing). The court in Triplett made this statement after the trial judge, who
participated in plea negotiations with counsel when the defendant was not present, wrongly did
not honor plea agreement in sentencing. Id at * 1.
170 Fanelli, 590 N.E.2d at 189.
171 Id.

172 Commonwealth v. Gaumond, No. 98-2813-14-15, 2002 WL732152, at *4 n.2 (Mass.
Super. Ct. April 19, 2002) (stating judges, no matter how knowledgeable and experienced, may
not know enough about a case to make sentencing recommendation). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 258B § 3(p) (2008) (describing victims' rights in Massachusetts). The statute, commonly
referred to as the Massachusetts Victim Bill of Rights, states, in relevant part, that victims have
the right, "to be heard through an oral and written victim impact statement at sentencing or the
disposition of the case against the defendant about the effects of the crime on the victim and as to
a recommended sentence... and to be heard at any other time deemed appropriate by the court."
Id.
173 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
174See People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208, 213 (Mich. 1993) (stating "judge's final
sentencing decision must await receipt of all the necessary information"). This statement, the
court made clear, was made with the idea that the judge may indicate a sentence during plea
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many matters that could lend themselves to "quick" sentencing
detenninations in chambers, a judge in haste may be assuming that he
knows enough to make an informed decision, only to later regret the quick
judgment without full information.
These cited examples of both successful and failed attempts at
judicial participation in plea negotiations will, we hope, stimulate
discussion on the topic. By analyzing nationwide court opinions and court
rules, in Massachusetts we can work toward a process where judicial
participation in plea negotiations can take place in appropriate, consistent,
and fair ways. The following section of recommendations, including an
appended "proposed" rule, is intended as a step toward that goal.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are based upon case law, relevant
literature, various standards, and discussion with many colleagues on the
bench and bar. These are designed to aid in ensuring a fair and just
resolution of criminal cases through plea agreements, with the appropriate
participation of a judge.
A.

Before a Conference in Chambers

Before engaging in a conference with counsel, judges should hold a
brief hearing on the record, with the defendant present. While on the
record, judges should inquire of a defendant to determine they understand
that the judge will be meeting alone with the attorneys, on the record, and
whether the defendant has any objection or problem with the judge doing
so. The judge should also inquire whether the defendant understands that
the judge may, after hearing from counsel for both the defendant and the
prosecution, indicate a sentence the judge would impose if the defendant
were to plead guilty. The judge should also make clear, however, that he
may decide not to make such a suggested sentence. The judge should also
ensure that the defendant understands that if he pleads guilty, the judge will
hear from the prosecutor and the victim and/or victim's family and may,
based on that or other information, change his mind regarding any sentence
previously indicated. The judge should then, consistent with the rules and
practice, allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, if one has been
entered. It is imperative that the judge inform the defendant, on the record,

discussions in chambers. Id. The court reiterated the law in Michigan that a victim has the right
to allocution at sentencing and to make a victim impact statement. Id. at 212-13.
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that he has every right not to plead guilty, for any reason, including, but not
limited to, disagreement with a sentence indicated by the court in the
conference in chambers.
The judge should also explain to the defendant that should the
judge indicate he will impose a particular sentence, and the defendant not
"accept" it and instead go to trial, that after trial the judge is not bound by
that sentence. The judge should explain carefully and in detail the reasons
why a sentence may be different after a trial, than had the defendant pled
guilty following a suggested sentencing recommendation from the judge
after a conference with counsel.
B.

Duringa Conference in Chambers

During an on-the-record conference with the attorneys in
chambers, the judge (other than a trial judge) should inquire whether any
other judge has previously discussed the possibility of a guilty plea in the
case and whether the attorneys have discussed a possible resolution
amongst themselves and with the judge. If this has happened, that should
also be part of the discussion with the defendant. The judge should hear
the positions of the attorneys regarding a resolution before indicating the
sentence he might impose; that is, counsel should make their
recommendations first, and thus make it clear the judge is responding to the
attorneys, versus actively taking a role in suggesting a sentence. The court
should also obtain from the attorneys and probation officer as much detail
as necessary regarding the crime and the defendant. The judge ought to
make clear that after getting further information during the sentencing
hearing - including from the victim, police reports, and/or pre-sentence
reports - he may change his mind on a sentence. The defendant would then
have the opportunity to consult with his attorney and withdraw his plea. A
judge who holds a chamber conference does not have to respond
immediately - or at all - to the attorneys with a suggested sentence, and
can certainly take more time to reflect on the possible sentence, including
considering other information, such as grand jury minutes, police reports,
the defendant's background information, and whatever else is deemed
relevant to a sentencing decision. The judge also has the discretion to not
indicate any sentence and instead let the matter go forward, whether the
defendant chooses to plead guilty or go to trial. It would be inappropriate
for the judge to request the conference on his own initiative, as that would
be a judge "actively" participating in plea bargaining, raising all the
dangers already discussed.
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After the Conference in Chambers

If the defendant decides to enter a guilty plea after a conference in
chambers, several things should be placed on the record in the courtroom at
the commencement of or during the guilty plea proceedings, in the
defendant's presence. The record should reflect those who were present
during the conference, that the defendant had no objection to it taking place
without his being present, and that the conference was on the record. The
judge should describe the substance of what was discussed in chambers and
inquire whether the defendant wishes to know more about the conference,
and whether defendant's counsel discussed it with him. The judge should
make clear that during his conference with the attorneys, and after the
judge heard from all parties, the judge indicated that if the defendant pleads
guilty, he (the judge) was inclined to impose a particular sentence, and
explain it in detail, including the reasoning behind it. The judge should
make available to the defendant a recording or transcript of the chambers
conference.
During the guilty plea colloquy, the judge who participates in
negotiations should also explain that the sentence the judge may impose is
subject to change based on any information the judge acquires during the
plea process, including during the recitation of the facts the defendant is
admitting to, as well as the evidence that comes forward at the sentencing
hearing.
This may include police reports, grand jury minutes, presentencing investigations, factual descriptions of the relevant incident(s),
and victim impact statements. The judge should make clear to the
defendant whether, if the judge changes his mind about the sentence, the
defendant will have an opportunity to withdraw the plea.
D.

Trial or Motion Session

If the negotiations with a judge about a change of plea take place in
a trial and/or motion session, all of the relevant issues should be explained
completely before the conference, and in open court on the record. It is
also important to ask the defendant specifically if he is being coerced into
pleading guilty because the case was pending in a trial or motion session.
If the defendant ultimately decides to plead guilty, the judge should remind
the defendant again that the conference in chambers took place with the
judge's participation, that the sentencing recommendation by the judge and
requests from counsel were made without the defendant being present, and
that the defendant did not feel any pressure to plead guilty because the
judge was about to hear a motion or preside over a trial.
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Following a judge's participation in plea negotiations, if the
defendant decides not to plead guilty, the judge should present the
defendant with the option of having another judge preside over the trial or
motion hearing, should the defendant decide to exercise that right.
Conversely, the judge set to preside over the trial or motion hearing may
want to consider sending the case to another judge for plea negotiations,
and if a guilty plea does not result, the trial judge would not be made aware
of what occurred during such negotiations.
If the defendant is before a judge and trial has already commenced,
a more detailed colloquy, specifically related to all of these relevant issues,
is appropriate. The defendant must understand that he should not plead
guilty if he disagrees with the sentence the judge would impose or because
he wants a trial. The defendant must also understand that the judge will not
punish him for choosing his constitutional rights to a hearing and/or trial,
but that the judge is also not bound to impose the sentence after a trial that
he has indicated in chambers, and that the judge may increase or decrease
the sentence subject to a number of factors, including but not limited to:
aggravating or mitigating evidence heard by the jury; the impact on the
victim(s) as a result of the crime(s), as heard at trial; the pre-sentence
investigation; and a sentencing hearing.
The judge should indicate that in fashioning the sentence that is
imposed after a guilty plea, rather than having those that go to trial possibly
receive a higher sentence as punishment for the exercise of that right, the
judge has considered that the defendant is entitled to some consideration,
leniency and a reduced sentence for accepting responsibility for the
crime(s) by pleading guilty. A reduced sentence is a "reward" for
accepting responsibility; a higher sentence is not punishment for going to
trial.
E.

ProhibitedActs

There are actions that have proven to be detrimental to the process
of judicial participation in plea negotiations and should be prohibited in
order to make certain that the process is carried out fairly. The judge should
not actively express any strong opinions on the strengths or weaknesses of
either side's case, on the defendant's decision to go to trial, or on the
victim's decision to press forward with the case. When a judge expresses
strong personal views about whether the defendant "should" plead guilty or
go to trial, he loses-or appears to lose-his impartiality and neutrality, acts in
a coercive manner, and deprives the defendant of fair treatment.
For similar reasons, the judge should not express any opinion about
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whether the defendant should waive his right to a jury trial. The judge
should not indicate that he would impose a different sentence if the
defendant went to trial as opposed to pleading guilty, and should not take
into account that a trial costs more money, takes extra or wastes time, or
puts the victim and/or witnesses through unnecessary pain or trauma.
Finally, a judge would render the process inappropriate if he referred to his
proposed disposition in chambers as an offer and should not engage in
bargaining down, or so-called "horsetrading."
V.

CONCLUSION

We recognize the importance of judicial participation in plea
negotiations, and believe it serves a useful role. It is our hope that this
article will lead to more open and public debate on this topic. Many
jurisdictions have addressed this issue more clearly, specifying rules and
guidelines through the courts and/or rules. Some have drawn a hard line
prohibiting it, and others have expressly allowed it, many of these with
conditions. These jurisdictions have at least taken on the issue by imposing
clear limits.
A number of others find themselves as we do in
Massachusetts -a full awareness that it takes place on a daily basis, but a
reluctance to set forth clear and comprehensive rules, even where serious
issues have arisen in a number of cases. There are certainly reasonable
disagreements on these issues, and perhaps with some of our discussion in
this article, some may wish that it be kept "under the radar," that we should
"leave well enough alone." Perhaps, some might urge, let it all be worked
out on a case by case basis, even though concrete experience suggests
otherwise.
In our view, the only way we can ensure that judicial
participation in plea negotiations occurs in Massachusetts in a way that is
fair to all involved, is to confront the practice head-on. We believe this is
best accomplished by beginning with an open recognition and discussion
amongst those on the bench and bar, and others interested, of all the issues.
Furthermore, the creation of clear, predictable, and specific guidelines will
lead to a consistent practice. The extremely large, friendly animal in the
room, so familiar to all of us, so helpful in "moving business" for so long,
has been stirring disquietly for some time. Before more lives are further
affected, it is time we acknowledged its presence in the day to day
functioning of our criminal justice system.
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APPENDIX A

Suggested Rule for Massachusetts

Generally:
1) A judge may participate in plea discussions only at the request
of the prosecution or the defense.
2) All plea discussions involving a judge must be recorded, and
made part of the record.
3) A judge need not participate in plea negotiations and is never
required, prior to a guilty plea, to indicate what sentence he may impose.
4) Once the judge has determined what he believes to be an
appropriate sentence, he must state, on the record, the full term of that
sentence and the information the sentencing assessment is based upon.
5) An initial sentencing assessment by the judge is not binding
upon him and the judge must make clear to the defendant that such
assessment is subject to change as additional information becomes
available through proper channels.
6) If the judge concurs with a plea agreement, or indicates a
sentence should the defendant plead guilty, but later, based on additional
evidence or testimony, including as it became known during the plea
colloquy, determines that the sentencing proposed was not appropriate, the
judge must inform the defendant of his decision to abandon his earlier
sentencing assessment, explaining his reasoning, and giving the defendant
the opportunity to withdraw his plea.

